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I. INTRODUCTION 
This wrongful death action arises from a collision between a high-speed Amtrak 
train and a motor vehicle driven by Brent Larrabee at a railroad crossing located at 102nd 
South in the City of South Jordan (the "Crossing"). The Appellants (the "Parents") 
appeal from the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Southern 
Pacific Transportation Co. ("Southern Pacific"), the owner and operator of the railroad 
line; National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak"), the owner and operator of the 
train; (Southern Pacific and Amtrak are collectively referred to the "Railroad 
Defendants"); and the City of South Jordan (the "City"), the roadway authority (the 
Railroad Defendants and the City are collectively referred to as the "Defendants"). 
For all the reasons set forth herein, this Court should reverse the district court's 
order granting the Defendants' motions for summary judgment and remand this matter to 
proceed to trial. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In its opening brief, the Parents set forth the material facts that are relevant and/or 
disputed in this case and shall not reiterate those facts in this Reply. The Parents are, 
however, compelled to respond to and clarify certain inaccurate statements propounded 
by the Defendants. 
A. The Railroad Defendants 
1. The Railroad Defendants refer to and set forth argument with respect to 
Brent Larrabee's conduct. The district court did not address or rule upon the negligence, 
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if any, of Brent Larrabee. Instead, the district court's order was predicted solely upon the 
concept of "duty." (R. at 1266-83.) Brent Larrabee's negligence, if any, is not an issue 
in this appeal and is not relevant in ascertaining the Railroad Defendants' legal duties. 
2. The Railroad Defendants assert that the train was visible when Brent 
Larrabee was stopped at the stop sign and that the condition of the crossing did not 
prevent Brent from seeing the train. This contention is contrary to evidence of record, 
and, at a minimum, is disputed. x r -
The evidence establishes that the train was not visible to the first two vehicles. 
Jacque Zimmerman, the driver of the first vehicle, stopped at the stop sign, looked both 
ways, failed to see a train, and proceeded across the tracks. (R. at 933, Zimmerman 
Depo., at pp. 37-38.) Jacob Wattleworth, a passenger in the first vehicle, looked both 
ways when Jacque stopped at the stop sign and also did not see the train. (R. at 916, 
Wattleworth Depo., at pp. 18, 20-24.) It was not until Jacque had driven onto the tracks 
that she or her passengers first saw the train. (Id. R. at 933, Zimmerman Depo., at 37-38) 
Brent Larrabee, the driver of the second vehicle, then came up to the stop sign at the 
Crossing and stopped. (R. at 925, Thornley Dep. at p. 61.) Brent remained stopped for 
approximately three seconds-sufficient time to look and see any noticeable train. (Id.) It 
is also undisputed that Brent drove the Tempo "slowly" onto the tracks. Railroad Br. at 
14. From Brent's conduct, a jury could reasonably infer that he did not see the train. 
Indeed, if Brent was attempting to beat the train, as the Railroad Defendants suggest, he 
would not have stopped for as long as he did only to proceed across the tracks "slowly." 
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The evidence also establishes that the existing warning devices were not fully 
visible to a motorist. The advance warning sign was not properly reflectorized, and the 
stop-ahead sign was improperly located and inadequately reflectorized. (R. at 891, 
Burnham Aff.) Further, the configuration of the crossing is such that a driver's visibility 
of northbound trains is highly restricted. (R. at 887; see also Memorandum of 
Surveillance Review, attached as part of Addendum C of the City of South Jordan's 
Brief (the Crossing "has a very bad crossing angle and poor sight distance").) 
The Railroad Defendants contend that "visibility actually is immaterial inasmuch 
as Larrabee in fact stopped perpendicular to the crossing," Railroad Br. at 5, and that 
"Larrabee obviously saw the stop sign before the crossing because the evidence is 
unrefuted he stopped . . . before driving onto the track." Railroad Br. at 17. The 
Railroad Defendants confuse the visibility of the stop sign with the visibility of the train. 
While the evidence suggests that Brent Larrabee saw the stop sign (e.g., he stopped), the 
evidence described above, at a minimum, presents a dispute of fact as to whether Brent 
Larrabee saw the train. 
3. The Railroad Defendants contend that, under Utah Code Ann. §41-6-27 
and -28, they are precluded from placing a warning sign at a railroad crossing. Railroad 
Br. at 9. The Railroad Defendants are wrong. The statute precludes the Defendants from 
placing an "unauthorized sign" at the crossing. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-27. But, as is 
clearly established in the record, UDOT authorized the placement of automatic gates and 
lights at the Crossing. See Parents' Opening Br. at 10-12. The Railroad Defendants 
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could have, at any time, requested and obtained UDOT's permission to install the 
"authorized" active warning devices. (R. at 998, 999, Hunter Aff; R. at 1002, 1004, 
Jerez Aff.) 
4. The Railroad Defendants assert that some of the Decedents' friends heard 
the horn prior to the collision. What the Railroad Defendants neglect to clarify is that the 
Decedents' friends heard the horn the instant before impact. (R. at 937, Wattleworth 
Dep. at p. 36; R. at 940, Sant Dep. at pp. 59-62.) Further, while an independent witness 
recalls hearing the horn, the witness does not know when he heard the horn in relation to 
the accident. (R. at 1536-40.) Whether the horn was sounded in a timely manner and 
whether a timely signal would have alerted Brent Larrabee to the existence of the train 
are disputed issues for a jury. 
B. The City 
1. The City "takes issue" with the Parents' assertion that the Crossing was 
ultra-hazardous. City Br. at 5. First, the City's objection to this characterization is not 
relevant to this appeal because the district court assumed that the crossing was ultra-
hazardous for purposes of rendering its decision. (R. at 1267, 1274). Thus, the issue in 
this appeal is whether the Defendants owed the Decedents a duty in light of the trial 
court's assumption, not whether the crossing was in fact ultra-hazardous. 
Second, the evidence establishes that the Crossing was ultra-hazardous. See 
Parents Opening Br. at 8-13. Since 1979, the Defendants have acknowledged that the 
Crossing is dangerous, and UDOT has urged the City improve the Crossing. (Id.) In 
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fact, the ultra-hazardous nature of the Crossing is established from the documentation 
that the City attaches to its brief.1 Indeed, faced with this evidence, the City concedes in 
its brief that "It is true that both UDOT and the City have . . . recognized that the crossing 
is 'dangerous' and/or that the existing passive protection is 'inadequate.'" City's Br. at 
23. 
2. The City acknowledges that it had two options - install active warning 
devices or close the Crossing - and asserts that, in 1992, it opted to close the Crossing. 
The City relies upon its decision to close the Crossing as an excuse for its failure to act. 
The City, notably, fails to address one crucial aspect of its so-called decision to close the 
Crossing: when. The City's failure to close the Crossing in a timely manner contributed 
to the Decedents' deaths. Even today, 21 years after UDOT first asked that active 
warning devices be installed, 8 years after the City purportedly opted to close the 
1
 The City attaches the following documents: 
1. A letter dated May 21,1990 from UDOT to the Mayor of the City of South 
Jordan that provides that the City must either close the crossing or install flashing light 
signals and automatic gates. In that letter, UDOT agrees to fund 90% of the cost of the 
improvement and asks the City to pay a mere 10% or $13,000 - less money than the City 
spent to improve the Crossing after the accident. UDOT also states that: "To avoid any 
further delays and risks regarding liability for accidents at the crossing, we encourage the 
City's commitment to participate in the automatic gates and flashing light signals."2. 
2. A surveillance review memorandum dated June 30, 1992, providing that 
when the new crossing is complete, "the city will close the existing access across the 
railroad tracks at 10200 South, which has a very bad crossing angle and poor sight 
distance." 
3. A letter dated October 20, 1992 from UDOT to the City stating that: "It has 
been noted that the railroad grade crossing requires Advance Warning Signs and 
pavement markings to be installed." 
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Crossing rather than install the warning devices, and over 4 years after the accident, the 
City still operates the Crossing in the same hazardous condition. 
3. The City refers to evidence allegedly establishing that the passive warning 
devices were visible. City's Br. at 10-11. The City misses the point. The visibility of 
the signs is not the issue in this case. The issue is whether the signs were adequate 
protection as a matter of law in light of the trial court's assumption that the Crossing was 
ultra-hazardous. .o 
The City also argues that Brent Larrabee should have seen the train because the 
headlights purportedly lit up the side of Zimmerman's vehicle. Whether Brent saw the 
train is a disputed issue of material fact for a jury to decide. (See supra, p. 2 at }^ 2.) 
III. ARGUMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE RAILROAD DEFENDANTS 
A. The District Court Erred in Holding that the Railroad Defendants Did 
Not Have a Duty to Provide Adequate Warning Devices or Take Other 
"Commensurate Measures" at the Ultra-Hazardous Crossing 
The district court held as a matter of law that the Railroad Defendants do not have 
a duty to provide or promote the adequacy of warning devices at ultra-hazardous 
crossings. (R. at 1274.) The district court ruled that the railroad's duty at ultra-hazardous 
crossings is limited to "conditions over which it has ownership or control." (R. at 1274.) 
The district court is incorrect. A railroad has, at every crossing, regardless of the ultra-
hazardous nature of the crossing, a duty to safely maintain its right of way and to 
maintain the conditions over which it has ownership or control. Duncan v. Union Pacific 
R. Co.. 790 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah App.1990); Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western 
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RJL, 749 P.2d 660, 662-64 (Utah App. 1988). The conditions over which a railroad has 
ownership or control include, for example, vegetation, dirt mounds, other railroad cars, 
and structures. Cf. Gleave. 749 P.2d at 664. Even at a flat, isolated, rural crossing, with 
little vehicular traffic and no curves in the road (i.e., a crossing which is clearly not ultra-
hazardous), a railroad must ensure that vegetation does not grow to the point of 
obscuring the view of an approaching train. 
The problem with the district court's ruling is that it does not distinguish between 
a railroad's duty at an ultra-hazardous crossing and a railroad's duty at all crossings, 
regardless of the ultra-hazardous nature. Utah law specifically imposes upon railroads a 
higher duty of care at ultra-hazardous crossings. As noted by this Court of Appeals: "'If 
a crossing is more than ordinarily hazardous, the railroad cannot simply ignore the fact 
and put the public in peril until the Department of Transportation acts. Until the 
department acts, the reasonable care standard requires the railroad to take other measures 
to reduce the risks of a crossing commensurate with the risks it imposes upon the 
public.'" Walker v. Union Pacific R. Co.. 844 P.2d 335, 341 n. 6 (Utah App. 1993) 
(quoting Wilde v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R.C Co.. No. C-83-149J, 1985 WL 
17370 at 3 (D. Utah. April 3, 1985)). 
Thus, contrary to the Railroad Defendants argument, while Utah Code Ann. §54-
4-15.1 vests UDOT with authority to govern the installation of warning devices, the 
statute does not abrogate the railroad's duty to protect the public at ultra-hazardous 
crossings. Under Walker. UDOT's duty to govern and the railroad's duty to protect co-
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exist at ultra-hazardous crossings. In fact, UDOT, pursuant to its governing authority, 
acted and determined that the existing crossing warning devices were not adequate at the 
Crossing. See Parents' Opening Br. at 10-12. While railroads may be required under the 
current statutory scheme to obtain UDOT's permission to install automatic warning 
devices, once obtained, the railroads may install warning devices at their own expense. 
(R. 998-1000, Hunter Aff.; and R. at 1002-04, Jerez Aff.) Contrary to Defendants' 
argument that they are prohibited from participating in the installation of warning 
devices, Utah regulations explicitly provide that "nothing shall preclude a railroad from 
participating in the cost of a project, if they so desire." Utah Admin. Code, R930-5-
4(B)(1). For example, in Wilde, the railroad placed a stop sign at a crossing after 
obtaining permission from the proper governing authority. 1985 WL 17370 at 1. In this 
case, the trial court assumed that the Crossing was ultra-hazardous. In light of this 
assumption, the trial court erred in holding that the Railroad Defendants did not owe a 
duty to the Decedents. Under Walker, the court should have held that the Railroad 
Defendants had a duty to take measures commensurate with the risks the Crossing 
imposed upon the public, and allowed the case to be determined by a jury. 
The Railroad Defendants criticize the Parents for defining an ultra-hazardous 
crossing as one at which the existing warning devices are inadequate. First, this 
argument is irrelevant because the question of whether the Crossing was in fact ultra-
hazardous is not at issue in this appeal: the trial court issued its ruling assuming the 
crossing was ultra-hazardous. (R. 1267, 1274.) Second, at the very least, the issue of 
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341. These "commensurate measures'' logically include reducing a train's speed. See 
Wilde, 1985 WL 17370 at 3 (a railroad can issue a slow order to fulfill its duty at ultra-
hazardous crossings). Because the Parents' speed claim is not preempted by Federal law, 
this Court should reverse the district court's order granting summary judgment. 
2. The Railroad Defendants Had the Duty7 to Brake 
The district court erroneously held that the train crew had no duty to apply the 
train's brakes on approach to the Crossing. (R. at 1276-78.) The Railroad Defendants 
misconstrue the Parents' position with respect to the train crew's duty to brake. 
Defendants assert that the Parents' claim that the train crew had a duty to brake is based 
solely upon the fact that the Crossing is more than ordinarily hazardous. Although, as set 
forth above, the train should have traveled through the Crossing at a reduced speed due 
to its ultra-hazardous nature, the train crew's duty to brake also arose because the 
engineers knew or should have known that the Larrabee vehicle might try to cross the 
tracks in front of the train. 
The Parents, of course, acknowledge that trains are large, fast moving 
instrumentalities and that a motorist approaching a crossing must exercise ordinary care 
and take reasonable precautions for his own safety. However, a motorist's duty at a 
crossing does not obviate a train crew's duty to attempt to avoid a collision when the 
crew knows or should know that there is a likelihood of danger to a person near the 
tracks. Under Utah law, once a crew becomes aware of a possible collision, it is 
obligated "to use all reasonable efforts to give warnings, to slacken [their] speed, and if 
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possible, to stop in time to avert an accident." Lawrence v. Bamberger R.R., 282 P.2d 
335, 338 (Utah 1955). 
The Parents' position with respect to this issue is simple: the district court's grant 
of summary judgment was improper because there are disputed issues of material fact as 
to whether the engineers knew or should have known that Brent Larrabee was unaware 
of the approach of the train. In fact, the train crew admitted that, at least 1500 feet before 
the Crossing, they were concerned that the cars' occupants were not be aware of the 
approaching train and that the motorists might drive onto the tracks and be hit. (R. at 
1006, ThornleyDep. at p. 53-56; R. at 1012-14, MaxfieldDep. at p. 61-62.) 
The Railroad Defendants' attempt to counter the train crew's un-refuted testimony 
by arguing that the crew had no reason to suspect that the motorists were unaware of the 
approaching train because "the motorists were obviously aware of the stop sign and track 
because they did stop." Railroads' Br. at 40. Once again, the visibility of the stop sign is 
not the issue — the knowledge of the oncoming train is. It matters little that a stop sign at 
a railroad crossing is visible if the train is not. Moreover, the Parents are entitled to the 
reasonable inference that Brent could not see the train: the passengers in the first car did 
not see the train until it was on the tracks, Brent stopped at the stop sign for three 
seconds, and Brent proceeded "slowly" across the tracks. Parents' Opening Br. at 7-8; 
Railroads' Br. at 14. A reasonable jury could conclude from these facts that Brent did 
not perceive the train while stopped at the stop sign. And, given the train crew's 
testimony, there are disputed issues of material fact regarding whether the train crew 
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knew or had reason to know that the cars were not aware of the train. Because a jury 
could reasonably find that the crew should have braked, summary judgment was 
improper. Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., 821 P.2d458,461 (Utah App. 1991). 
C. The District Court Erred in Holding that Amtrak Did Not Have a 
Duty to Provide Adequate Audible Warning of the Train's Approach 
The district court held that Amtrak had no duty to sound the emergency whistle 
pattern when approaching the crossing on three bases: (1) there was no evidence that the 
train could not be seen; (2) there is no authority to support the position that an emergency 
whistle pattern is prescribed at every ultra-hazardous crossing; and (3) the issue is 
preempted. The court erred in its holding. 
With respect to the visibility issue, Utah law provides that once a train crew 
becomes aware of a possible collision, they are obligated "to use all reasonable efforts to 
give warnings," which would include audible warnings. Lawrence. 287 P.2d at 338. 
There is no case nor public policy which abrogates this duty when a train is capable of 
being seen. Further, whether the train in this case was in plain sight is clearly a disputed 
issue of material fact. (Parents' Opening Br. at 7-8.) 
With respect to sounding an emergency whistle pattern, the Parents do not suggest 
that an emergency whistle pattern should be sounded at every ultra-hazardous crossing. 
The Parents contend that, because the train crew knew or should have known that the 
vehicles were unaware of the approach of the train (R. at 1006, Thornley Depo., at p. 53-
56; R. at 1012-14, Maxfield Depo. at p. 61-62), the crew should have used all reasonable 
efforts to alert the motorists to the existence of the train at this Crossing. Lawrence, 282 
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P.2d at 338. When a train crew has reason to know that a collision may occur, an 
emergency whistle pattern in prescribed. (R. at 1038-39, Byrnes Aff.) 
The Railroad Defendants contend that there is ample evidence that the horn was 
sounded because "many of the decedents' friends heard the horn." Railroads' Br. at 41. 
The Defendants fail to point out, however, that the Decedents' friends heard the horn 
only the instant before the collision. (R. at 937, Wattleworth Dep. at p. 36; R. at 940, 
Sant Dep. at pp. 59-62.) Abram Sant, a passenger in the third vehicle, testified that he 
heard the train horn on its approach to the prior crossing and knew the train was 
approaching the subject Crossing. He testified that he did not hear the train sound its 
horn between the prior crossing and the subject Crossing and only heard the horn at the 
instant of the collision. (R. at 940-944; Sant Dep. at p. 59,1. 22 to p. 62,1. 5.) Thus, 
whether the horn was blown in a timely manner is a disputed issue of material fact. 
With respect to preemption, the district court's ruling that the pattern in which the 
horn is sounded is preempted by federal law is wrong. Federal law preempts the 
standards for the horn equipment, but not the use of the horn. See, e.g.. Locomotive 
Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. §§20701, et seq.; First Sec. Bank v. Union Pacific R. Co., 152 
F.3d 87, 880 (8th Cir. 1998) (federal law preempts claims that the horn equipment is 
inadequate). In its Memorandum Decision, the district court relied upon United 
Transportation Union v. Foster, No 98-2443 E/5, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14576 (E.D. La. 
Sept. 9, 1998) in support of its position that the pattern of the horn is preempted by 
federal law. (R. at 1276.) However, on March 17, 2000, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
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Appeals reversed the lower court's ruling in that case and specifically held that while 
federal regulations preempt the "audible warning equipment," the regulations do not 
preempt "the manner in which such signals are sounded." United Transp. Union v. 
Foster, 205 F.3d 851, 862 (5th Cir. 2000). The Fifth Circuit also noted that "FRSA 
preemption is even more disfavored than preemption generally" because of the need to 
consider railroad safety. Id. at 860. 
At a minimum, there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute regarding 
whether the train crew knew or had reason to know that the cars were not aware of the 
train. A jury could reasonably find that the crew failed to provide adequate audible 
warning of the train's approach and therefore summary judgment was improper. 
Kitchen, 821 P.2dat461. 
D. Brent Larrabee's Negligence, If Any, Is Not Ripe For Appellate 
Review, Presents A Question Of Fact And Does Not Bar Plaintiffs9 
Right To Recover 
The Railroad Defendants' claim that Brent Larrabee was contributorily negligent 
as a matter of law and that his negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident. 
They also claim that Brent Larrabee violated Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-95(a)(4), because 
he proceeded across the crossing when it was not safe to do so. In ruling upon the 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the district court did not address and rule upon the 
negligence, if any, of Brent Larrabee. As such, this issue is not before this Court for 
appellate review and the Court should decline to consider it. 
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If this Court decides to review the issue, the Railroad Defendants are still not 
entitled to an adjudication of Brent Larrabee's negligence, if any, at this stage of the 
proceedings. Causation "cannot be resolved as a matter of law." Butterfield v. Okubo, 
831 P.2d 97, 106 (Utah 1992). Causation is a "highly fact-sensitive element of any cause 
of action." Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding. 909 P.2d 1283, 1292 (Utah App. 
1996). "To establish causation, the Parents must persuade a fact finder that their injury 
was a natural result of the defendant's breach." Id. (emphasis added). The factual 
resolution of causation does not lend itself to a determination on summary judgment. 
See, e.g.. Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo. 888 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1995); cf. 
Southern Pac. Co. v. Ralston, 67 F.2d 958 (10th Cir. 1933) (proximate cause is a question 
of fact) and Berg v. U.S.. 806 F.2d 978 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying Colorado law, 
proximate cause is a question of fact). Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary 
judgment cannot be upheld on this basis. 
Further, comparative negligence, not contributory negligence, is the law in Utah. 
Pursuant to § 78-27-38: "The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone bar 
recovery by that person," and "A person seeking recovery may recover from any 
defendant or group of defendants whose fault. . . exceeds the fault of the person seeking 
recoveryf.]" Accordingly, the negligence, if any, of Brent Larrabee does not bar the right 
of Ross and Carma Larrabee to recover unless Brent's fault exceeded the fault 
attributable to the Defendants. At the very least, a genuine issue of material fact exists as 
to whether the negligence of the Defendants exceeded the negligence, if any, of Brent 
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Larrabee.2 Moreover, the negligence, if any, of Brent Larrabee under no circumstances 
bars the rights of Daniel Price, Susanne Price, Kent Swensen, or Kay Swensen to 
recover from the Defendants. Even if such alleged negligence on the part of Brent 
Larrabee exceeded the negligence of the Defendants, there is no competent evidence that 
either Aaron Price or Jamie Swensen were at fault. The Railroad Defendants' reliance on 
Butler v. Payne. 59 Utah 383, 203 P. 869 (1921), Gunbv v. Colorado & S. R.R., 235 P. 
566 (Colo. 1925), Abdulkadir v. Western Pacific Railroad. 7 Utah 2d 53, 318 P.2d 339 
(1957), and Lundquist v. Kennecott Copper Co.. 30 Utah 2d 262, 516 P.2d 1182 (1973), 
in which cases contributory negligence was the prevailing law, is erroneous. 
IV, ARGUMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE CITY 
A. The District Court Erred In Finding that the City Had No Duty to 
Upgrade the Warning Devices or Provide Additional Protection at the 
Crossing and Erred in Finding that the Existing Warning Devices 
Were Adequate 
The district court erred in concluding that the City did not have a duty to upgrade 
the warning device or take other measures to protect the public at the Crossing. The 
district court also erred in finding that the warning devices were adequate. 
The scope of the City's duty to warn the public of dangerous conditions on public 
streets is set forth in Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light. 969 P.2d 403, 406 (Utah 1998). 
In Fishbaugh, the Utah Supreme Court noted that "a municipality . . . has a duty to warn 
2
 There is sufficient evidence in this case for a jury to conclude that Brent 
Larrabee was not at fault for this collision: the crossing was ultra-hazardous; the 
warning devices installed at the crossing were inadequate; and the train crew failed to 
give adequate and proper audible warning of the train's approach. 
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of dangerous conditions on its streets." Id. The duty requires a municipality to provide 
"reasonably sufficient" warning to advise motorists of the hazardous conditions of the 
roadway and may encompass "various mediums, including the use of lights." id. 
Whether the City provided "reasonably sufficient" warnings to advise the public of the 
dangers of the Crossing is a question of fact for a jury to determine. 
The City's reliance on Jones v. Bountiful City. 834 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1992) is 
misplaced. In Jones, the plaintiff argued that the City of Bountiful had a common law 
duty to install traffic control devices at an intersection where the city had notice of 
previous accidents. The court held that "common law requires only that once the 
municipality takes action to install [traffic control] devices, it must do so in a non-
negligent manner." Id. at 550. In Jones, the determination of whether to install a traffic 
light at a roadway intersection was a discretionary function of the city. While the 
authority to select and install traffic control devices rests with municipalities, see Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-22, the discretion to determine the type of safety device to place at a 
railroad crossing rests with UDOT, not with the City, see Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15(2). 
At the subject Crossing, UDOT determined that additional warning devices were 
necessary. As such, the Jones holding is not applicable. 
The City also claims that it is not liable because Brent Larrabee violated Utah 
Code § 41-6-95. A motorist's obligation to comply with the Utah Code does not obviate 
the City's duty to maintain a safe railroad crossing. Brent's alleged violation of the 
statute goes to the issue of comparative negligence and does not bar recovery. Utah 
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whether the Crossing was ultra-hazardous is a disputed issue of material fact. The Utah 
Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have stated that a crossing may be ultra-
hazardous "if, for any reason, devices employed at the crossing [are] rendered inadequate 
to warn the public of the danger of an approaching train." Duncan v. Union Pac. R.R. 
Co.. 842 P.2d 832, 834 (Utah 1992); Hobbs v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R.. 677 
P.2d 1128, 1129 (Utah 1984); and English v. Southern Pacific Co.. 13 Utah 407, 419-20, 
45 P. 47, 50 (1896). Under this definition and the facts of this case (see Parents' 
Opening Br. at 8-13), a reasonable jury could find that the Crossing was ultra-hazardous. 
The Railroad Defendants also argue that the Duncan holdings are dispositive of 
any issue relating to the adequacy of the warnings. While the Duncan holdings may be 
helpful in ascertaining the Railroad Defendants' duty, the holdings are factually and 
legally distinct from this case. In Duncan, the issue was whether the crossing was more 
than ordinarily hazardous. Once the court determined that the crossing was not more 
than ordinarily hazardous, the court found that the railroad did not have a duty with 
respect to the adequacy of the warning devices. In this case, however, the issue is not 
whether the crossing was more than ordinarily hazardous. The trial court assumed that 
the crossing was more than ordinarily hazardous. (R. at 1267, 1274.) The issue is, 
because the crossing is more than ordinarily hazardous, whether the Railroad 
Defendants satisfied their duty with regard to the adequacy of the warning devices as a 
matter of law. The Parents believe that the answer is "No," but recognize that the issue 
must be ultimately decided by a jury. See, e ^ , Duncan. 790 P.2d at 598 ("The railroad 
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is required to take precautions to prevent injury to crossing motorists if a reasonable 
person in the railroad's position would take such precautions."); Wilde, No. 1985 WL 
17370 at 3 ("[I]f a fact finder determines that the conditions around the grade crossing do 
render the warning employed at the Crossing . . . inadequate to warn the public of 
danger, the fact finder is then in the position to determine whether the railroad exercised 
reasonable care in running a train through the Crossing without taking further 
precautions."). 
Moreover, despite the district court's ruling and the Railroad Defendants' 
argument, the Supreme Court's holding in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 
U.S. 658 (1993) is instructive. The Easterwood Court held that a railroad maintains joint 
responsibility with the local road authority for the adequacy of warning devices despite 
state statutes pertaining to the responsibility for the actual placement of the devices. Id. 
at 664 n. 5. 
In sum, under Walker, Wilde, and Duncan Utah law may be summarized as 
follows: A railroad has a duty to maintain its right of way at all crossings. In addition to 
this general duty, a railroad has a higher duty to protect the public at ultra-hazardous 
crossings by taking protective measures commensurate with the risks the crossing 
imposes upon the public. A crossing may be ultra-hazardous due to any condition, 
including the configuration of the land or the use of the tracks by a high volume of high 
speed trains, that renders the warnings employed at the crossings inadequate to warn the 
public of danger. The paramount consideration at ultra-hazardous crossings is whether a 
SaltLake-122331.1 0033492-00001 10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reasonable person in the railroad's position would recognize the need for precautionary 
measures in addition to any which might already exist. Whether a reasonable person 
would undertake to provide additional precautionary measures raises a question of fact 
for determination by a jury. Because the district court failed to apply this higher level of 
duty, summary judgment should be vacated. 
B. The District Court Erred in Holding that the Railroad Defendants 
Had No Duty to Reduce the Train's Speed at the Subject Crossing 
1. The Railroad Defendants Had a Duty to Lower the Train Speed 
The district court erred in concluding that the Parents' claim that the train was 
traveling at an excessive speed was preempted by federal law. The Parents do not 
contend that the speed limit for the track was excessive or that the track speed generally 
should have been reduced. Rather, the Parents allege that the Railroad Defendants 
should have required the train crew to reduce its speed over the Crossing because the 
ultra-hazardous nature of the Crossing constituted a local safety hazard. 
Although federal regulations set track speed, the regulations do not mandate train 
speed. Parents' Opening Br. at 29 n.5. A railroad is not permitted to run its trains at the 
maximum track speed regardless of local hazards. The federal statutory framework is 
clear: it provides an exception to federal preemption of train speed where necessary to 
eliminate or reduce an "essentially local safety hazard." 49 U.S.C. § 20106 (1994); see 
also Easterwood. 507 U.S. at 675 n. 15 (explicitly recognized that railroads have "the 
duty to slow or stop to avoid a specific, individual hazard"). The conditions of the 
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Crossing that make it ultra-hazardous also qualify it as a "local safety hazard": the "S" 
configuration of the crossing, the raised track, the poor sight lines, the high volume of « 
high-speed trains, and the faded and ineffective signs and pavement markings. Parents' 
Opening Br. at 8-13; see Stone v. CSX Transp., Inc., 37 F.Supp.2d 789, 796-97 
(S.D.W.V. 1999); see also In re: Speed Limit for the Union Pacific R.R., No. CI-99-
1722, 2000 WL 622557, *7 (Minn. App. May 16, 2000). The crossing's local hazardous 
nature is verified by the numerous train/motor vehicle collisions at the Crossing. 
Contrary to the Railroad Defendants' assertion, Stone v. CSX Transportation is 
directly on point. The Railroad Defendants try to distinguish Stone by suggesting that 
the crossing in Stone was found to be a local safety hazard because the railroad knew the 
gates regularly malfunctioned. Defendants are wrong. According to the Stone court, the 
crossing was a local safety hazard as a matter of law because "the sight lines are short 
and drivers sitting at the crossing cannot see a train coming until it is nearly upon them," 
and because of inadequate protection. 37 F.Supp.2d at 796. To the extent that a 
railroad's knowledge of inadequate protection is relevant to this inquiry, this case is 
similar to Stone: there is substantial evidence that the Defendants knew that the existing 
warning devices were inadequate. (Parents' Opening Br. at 8-13) 
The 'local safety hazard" exception to federal pre-emption dovetails directly with 
Utah's common law regarding ultra-hazardous crossings. Utah law imposes upon 
railroads a duty to take all necessary protective measures at ultra-hazardous crossings 
commensurate with the risks the crossing imposes upon the public. Walker, 844 P.2d at 
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Code Ann. § 78-27-38. Further, whether Brent Larrabee failed to comply with Utah 
Code § 41-6-95 is a question of fact. The statute provides that a person driving a vehicle 
must stop at a railroad grade crossing when a train emits an audible warning or when a 
train is plainly visible. Therefore, a condition precedent to the duty to stop is that a 
motorist has notice of an approaching train. The evidence suggests that Brent Larrabee 
did not have notice of the approaching train. See Parents' Opening Br. at 7-8; Railroads' 
Br. at 14. 
Because the district court applied the wrong duty of care and ignored all of the 
evidence that the existing warning devices were inadequate, this Court should reverse the 
district court's order granting the City's motion for summary judgment. 
B. The City of South Jordan Is Not Immune Under the Governmental 
Immunity Act 
Tacitly recognizing that the district court erred on the issue of duty, the City 
devotes the bulk of its argument to the issue of governmental immunity. (City's Br. at 
30-39.) However, the district court did not even rule upon the issue of governmental 
immunity. In fact, it specifically stated that "the Court does not reach the issue of 
governmental immunity." (R. at 1283.) If the Court wishes to reach this issue, the 
Parents incorporate by reference their memorandum in opposition to the City's motion 
for summary judgment on this point. (R. at approx. 581-89.) 
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C. The Issue of Causation Is Not Ripe for Appellate Review, Presents a 
Question of Fact and Does Not Bar the Parents' Right to Recover 
The City claims that Brent Larrabee's conduct was the sole proximate cause of the 
accident. In ruling upon the Motion for Summary Judgment, the district court did not 
address and rule upon the negligence, if any, of Brent Larrabee. As such, this issue is not 
properly before this Court for appellate review. However, if this Court decides to review 
the issue, the City would still not be entitled to an adjudication of Brent Larrabee's 
negligence, if any, at this stage of the proceedings. Causation "cannot be resolved as a 
matter of law." Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d at 106. In railroad/vehicle collision 
cases, such as the present case, courts have consistently held that, despite the potential 
negligence of the plaintiff, the issue of proximate cause is properly decided by a jury. 
See Smith v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. ,311 N.E.2d 462 (Ind.App. 1974); Emery v. 
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.. 127 N.W.2d 826 (Mi. 1964); Missouri, Kansas & 
Texas Railroad Co. v. Dodson. 356 P.2d 1079 (Ok. 1960). ' < 
The Utah cases cited by the City in support of its proximate cause argument are 
inapposite. In those cases, the court found in favor of the defendants because there was 
no evidence of a causal link between the duty allegedly breached and the injury. For 
example, in Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360 (Utah 1986), parents of a child 
who was injured when he fell, at an unspecified point along a shoreline, sued the city that 
maintained a dam at one point along the stream. The court resolved proximate cause in 
favor of the city because there was no evidence at all indicating the point where the child { 
fell into the creek. In Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 893 P.2d 598 (Utah App. 1995), 
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plaintiff was injured in a multi-car accident. The court found that plaintiff had not 
shown any evidence of proximate cause because there was no evidence regarding which 
car, if any, struck the plaintiff 
Here, however, there is strong evidence of a causal link between the failure to 
adequately warn the motorists of the approach of a train and the accident. There is 
evidence that the crossing is poorly designed, has poor sight lines, and is confusing. 
(Parents' Br. at 8-13). There is evidence that the warnings were inadequate to warn 
motorists of oncoming trains, even when motorists heed those warnings. (Id. at 7, ^ f 5.) 
There is evidence that Brent could not perceive the train while stopped at the stop sign. 
(Id. at 7, Railroad's Br. at 14.) This is ample evidence to make the issue of causation a 
disputed issue of material fact. 
D. The Affidavit Submitted by Plaintiffs Comply with the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure and Rules of Evidence 
Defendants' arguments regarding the admissibility of the affidavits of Burnham, 
Hunter, Jerry, Clenderin, and Byrns are wrong. Defendants mischaracterize these 
affidavits and impune their authors. For example, the Affidavit of Archie Bumham 
clearly meets the criteria of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) and the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. (R. at 889-92.) Mr. Bumham is highly qualified and competent to testify 
regarding the traffic engineering and safety issues at the subject crossing and his 
statements contained in the affidavit are based on his personal knowledge and 
experience. As stated in his affidavit, Mr. Bumham has evaluated the safety aspects of 
over five hundred railroad grade crossings. He has served as the chief traffic and safety 
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engineer for the Georgia Department of Transportation Traffic Safety Program, the 
chairman of the Rail Highway Grade Crossing sub-committee for the Manual of Uniform 
Traffic Control Devices, and advisor to the National Safety Council and the U.S. 
Department of Transportation on railroad grade crossing safety issues. 
Mr. Bumham personally examined and evaluated the subject crossing. His 
conclusion that the crossing was ultra hazardous is based on sound traffic engineering 
principles which he sets out in his affidavit. (Id.) His other conclusions that the crossing 
required automatic warning devices and that the sight distance for approaching trains was 
insufficient are also based on sound traffic engineering principles. Furthermore, these 
conclusions are completely consistent with other evidence in the record including 
engineering studies preformed by UDOT and the City of South Jordan, (id.) Because 
the affidavit of Mr. Bumham and the others comport with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
56(c) and the Rules of Evidence, the district court erred in striking them. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein and for the reasons set forth in the Parents' 
opening brief, this Court should reverse the district court's order granting the 
Defendants' motions for summary judgment because the district court imposed the 
wrong duties of care upon the Defendants and ignored the disputed issues of material 
fact. The matter should be remanded to the district court to proceed to trial. 
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